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ABSTRACT
Uniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent
years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify
and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may
prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political
motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may
be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than
under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ. Second,
an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods
producers for import protection. Third, a precommitment effect
may increase the cost to a future government of protecting
favored sectors. None of these arguments provides an
unambiguous, airtight case for tariff uniformity. The decision
on uniformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
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World Bank Harvard University
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CECTP Cambridge, MA 02138
1818 H Street, N.H.
Washington, DC 20433For some time now, the uniform-tariff rule has fascinated both economists and policy makers.
More than three decades ago, Corden (1958) suggested that Australia replace its complex system of
quantitative import restrictions and tariffs by a uniform tariff. Corden's proposal generated a lot ot
controversy and eventually led to some movement towards tariff uniformity in Austratia. A case for
uniform effective protection was also made by Macarlo (1964) in the debate on industrialization in Latin
America. More recently, Balassa (1989) and Harberger (1990) have argued in favor of a uniform tariff
in the context of trade reform in developing countries.
During the 1980s, the World Bank has aggressively promoted a greater uniformity in tariff rates
in developing countries. The structural adjustment and trade reform programs of the World Bank have
often recommended the abolition of quantitative import restrictions and increased unithrmity in tariffs.
Partially as a result of these programs, Bolivia has adopted a more or less uniform tariff rate of l7%.2
Chile has maintained a single tariff rate across all imports since the late 1970s. Mexico has also moved
towards a greater uniformity by adopting three tariff rates.All of these countries have abolished
quantitative import restrictions entirely.
The intuitive appeal of uniform tariffs derives from the belief that they minimize the efficiency
cost of protection. Conventionally, policy advisors have argued that uniform nominal tariffs equalize the
effective rates of protection across sectors. Therefore, if protection of the entire industrial sector is the
objective, uniform nominal tariffs will be the least costly means of achieving the objective.
Economists have pointed out continually, however, that uniform tariffs neither minimize the cost
of protection, nor do they necessarily equalize effective rates of protection across sectors. In a paper
written almost three decades ago, Johnson (1964) noted that the argument for tariff uniformity fails to
take into account the distortion in consumption which inevitably accompanies tariffs. He went on to
See Corden (1968) for details.
A small number of tariff rates remain different from this rate.demonstrate that once the distortion in consumption is taken into account, the tariff structure which
minimizes the social cost of providing a given level protection is nonuniform.
Corden (1971) provided the first systematic analysis of the uniform tariff rule. In addition to
noting the implications of distortions in consumption a Ia Johnson. he provided a number of reasons for
why a uniform tariff will fail to yield the desired objective of a uniform effective tariff. For example,
he demonstrated that if importables use exportable inputs or some exportables use imported inputs,
uniform nominal tariffs will actually yield non-uniform effective protection. In a later contribution,
Corden (1974) concluded,
..any fanaticism about effective rate uniformity should be avoided... It may sometimes
be best to have a small stock of three or four basic nominal rates Out of which all
effective rates are constructed, the aim being to only avoid excessive nonuniformity in
effective rates without any pretence that complete uniformity in effective rates can or
should be achieved.
This view is reinforced by considerations such as smuggling, economies of scale, and imperfect
competition. As noted in Panagariya (1990). not all goods can be smuggled with uniform ease.
Automobiles are far more difficult to smuggle than wrist watches. Therefore, even if nominal tariffs are
set at equal rates, their impact on different industries will be nonuniform. Similarly, the presence of
economies of scale and/or imperfect competition will rule out the equalization of effective protection via
equalization of nominal tariff rates.
The case for a uniform nominal tariff is further weakened if the objective behind tariffs is revenue
rather than protection. We know from Ramsey (1927) that optimal revenue raising taxes bear an inverse
relationship to elasticities of demand. Thus. ceteris paribus, the higher the elasticity of demand for
imports of a good, the lower the optimal rate of tariff on it. Tariff uniformity can be justified only if
import demand elasticities are more or less uniform across commodities and cross-price effects are
unimportant.
2As a result of these criticisms,policy advisorshave lately begun to rely more heavily on
administrative simplicity and the political context as arguments for tariff uniformity.' According to the
administrative simplicity argument, uniform tariffs make trade regime more transparent and relatively
easy to administer. There is little room for confusion with respect to the tariff rate to he paid by the
importer. Also, potential investors do not have to engage in wasteful employment of resources in order
to understand a complex tariff code. Although tariff simplicity is likely to confer these gains on the
economy, their quantitative significance is in some doubt. It is possible, indeed plausible, that such gains
will be more than offset by the losses arising out of departures from optimal tariff rates. For this reason,
the case for tariff uniformity must rest largely on political-economy arguments.
What are the political-economy arguments for a uniform tariff? To date, this question has not
been answered satisfactorily. With the exception of brief, verbal discussions (e.g., Panagariya (1990)),
political-economy arguments for a uniform tariff have simply not been spelled out. This is all the more
surprising since in recent years the literature on the political economy of trade policy has grown rapidly.
In this paper, we provide a formal analysis of some political-economy arguments for uniform
ariffs. The paper follows the tradition of Brock and Magee (1979), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Feenatra
and Bhagwati (1982), Mayer (1984) and Rodrik (1986) where the authors have sought to model the
formation of tariffs and other trade policies.' An important novel feature of our paper is that whereas
the existing literature has focussed on tariff formation in a single sector, we consider the endogenous
determination of the entire tariff structure.
We present three different models in which a uniform tariff rule may be adopted as a way of
minimizing the welfare costs of endogenously-determined tariffs. In the first two models, considered in
For example, see Thomas et al. (1991).
The empirical literature in this tradition includes Pincus (1975), Caves (1976) and Anderson and
Baldwin (1981).
3Sections 1 and 2. respectively, tariffs are demand determined. The government is essentially unable to
resist the lobbying pressure. In the third model, discussed in Section 3, tariffs are supply determined in
the sense that they result from the government's preference for certain sectors over the others.
In Section 1. we consider a model with n importables. We assume that each importable can
obtain protection via lobbying. If the government adopts a uniform tariff rule, whatever protection is
granted to one sector is automatically extended to all importables. Its this setting, a free-rider problem
emerges and, rather remarkably, only one sector lobbies for protection in equilibrium. The sector which
lobbies devotes less resources to lobbying under the uniform tariff rule than when tariff rates are allowed
to diverge. If the number of sectors in the economy is large, welfare is higher under the uniform tariff.
This model is closely related to that in Rodrik (1986). The latter provides an explanation of why
a welfare maximizing government may choose tariffs rather than subsidies even though tariffs distort
consumption. Rodrik considers a model with one importable where lobbying takes place at the level of
the firm. A free-rider problem exists at the firm level under a tariff regime but not under a subsidy
scheme. In this setting, production subsidies are not always welfare superior. We will point out the main
differences between our model and that of Rodrik later, although it may be noted here that in the latter,
lobbying is done by all firms even when the free-rider problem is present.
Our second model considers a Situation where imports also include intermediate inputs. We
deliberstely rule Out any free rider problem here and focus on penalties on final importables arising Out
of tariffs on imported inputs. We show that if imported inputs are neither produced at home nor used
in exportables, welfare is unambiguously higher under a uniform tariff rule. If any of these conditions
is violated, the welfare ranking is ambiguous in general.
Our third model is based on the assumption that the government is itself interested in promoting
certain sectors. Under such circumstances, the adoption of a uniform tariff rule may tie the government's
hands to some extent. Ve show once again that the tariff on the preferred sector is lower under auniform tariff regime than when tariffs are allowed to diverge. The welfare ranking is ambiguous in
general. If the share of the preferred sectors in GDP is low, welfare is higher under the uniform tariff
regime.
The paper is organized as follows. In sections I to 3, we discuss the three models outlined
above. In Section 4, we provide some concluding remarks.
1. Model I; The Free-Rider Effect
Throughout this paper, we assume that the country under consideration is small in that it takes
the world commodity terms of trade as given. By appropriate choice of units, we set the world prices
of all goods equal to unity. Domestic prices differ from the world prices by the amount of trade taxes
paid per unit.
Formally, our analysis may be cast in terms of a two stage model. in the first stage, the
government chooses the tariff regime. In the second stage, all economic activity takes place and
producers decide how much political activity to undertake. By assumption, only two options are available
to the government in the first stage: a uniform tariff regime and a regime where tariff rates are allowed
to diverge. Under the former regime, the government guarantees the same tariff rate for all sectors but
is unable to choose its level. The level of tariffs is determined by political activity by producers
(lobbying, for short) which the government is unable to resist. Under the alternative regime, both the
level and structure of tariffs are determined by lobbying pressures.
We begin with a deliberately simple model. A key feature of this model is that protection to an
importable will come entirely at the expense of the exportable. Stated differently, increased protection
to one importable will have no effect whatsoever on the output of other importables. This feature of the
model helps us distinguish the effects arising purely due to the free-rider problem under a uniform-tariff
regime from those attributable to the interdepndence of the degree of protection across different
5importables. Later in the paper, we consider situations where the degree of protection in one sector
depends on the rates of tariff in other sectors.
Let us begin by assuming that there are n+ I goods labeled 0, i,... n. Good 0 is a composite
exportable and goods 1,... nate importables. There are no taxes on the exportable so that its domestic
price equals the world price. 1. The domestic price of the ia importable equals 1 +t where t is the
valorem tariff on the good.
As noted earlier, we want to rule out the effects of a change in the tariff on one good on the
degree of protection available to other importables. This feature is built into the model by assuming that
each importable uses labor and a sector-specific capital while the exportable uses only labor. The latter
assumption implies that the wage rate will equal the price of the exportable, which is, in turn, fixed in
the world market at I. Thus, importables and lobbyists will face an infinitely elastic supply of labor at
wage rate 1. This ensures that a change in labor employment in an importable will be accompanied by
an equal and opposite change in the exportable sector but no change in the quantity of labor and output
in other importable sectors.
Letting X1, L and K,, respectively, be the output, labor and capital in sector i, the production
function for good i may be written
(I) X1 =F(L,,K1)FL() >0. LL()<0;=I. ...n
where F1()islinear homogeneous in L1 and K1 and FL() and F() are, respectively, the first and
second partials of F'() with respect to L,. Remembering that capital is sector specific, K is exogenously
fixed. Weassumethat the F'(.)are distinctacross sectors in the sense thatF()F'()for L, =
(i,j = 1n).
Each sector consists ofseveralidentical, perfectlycompetitivefirms. We assume that in making
I
their hiring decisions, all firms act as perfect competitors in factor markets. Thus, they equate the value
of marginal product of each factor to its price.
6Taking thetariffrate as givenforthe moment, we can summarize the outcomeofthe firms'
production decisions in sector i in a restricted protit function, i(1 +t,, w; K.). Here w'() is convex in
I +t, and w. As usual, equilibrium levels of X, and L may be written
(2) X1 =,c(1tLw; K)
(3) L,
=— +(, w; Kd)
wherelrj(') (j= 1,2) is the first partial of ir() with respect to the jth argument.
We assume that lobbying is undertaken by sector-specific factors only. This assumption is
consistent with the structure of the economy outlined above. Being employed in n+ I different sectors,
labor is highly diffused. By contrast, sector-specific factors are concentrated.
We make three additional assumptions. First, capitalists in sector i do not consume good i.
This assumption simplifies the algebra and does not affect any of our qualitative conclusions. Second,
lobbying is done at the sectoral level rather than at the level of the firm. Once again, this assumption
simplifies the notation considerably without undue influence on the results. Finally, we assume that the
lobbyists do not exert any monopsony power in labor market. Under the assumptions made so far, the
wage rate is determined entirely in the exportable sector. Therefore, lobbyists, like tirms, face a
perfectly elastic supply of labor and do not have any monopsony power.
We are now in a position to specify the lobbying process.6 By assumption, lobbying requires
only labor. For brevity, we will refer to the uniform-tariff regime as UTR and to the regime which
permits tariff divergence across sectors as non-uniform tariff regime or NTR. Under NTR, the
relationship between the tariff and lobbying is summarized in the "production function" g() exhibiting
decreasing returns to scale. Thus,
In terms of an old saying in India. "The baker never eats his own cake."
6Thelobbying process described below is a modification of Rodrik (1986).
7(4a)N71: 1g(1,)g(O) =0, g'(1)>0, g"(1)0;i=1, ...n
where 1is the amountoflaboremployed inlobbyinginsector i.Observe that weare assuming that all
sectorsface the same g(.) function. This assumption implies that all sectors have equal access" to
protection and is intended to neutralize a potential source of asymmetry across sectors. We shall consider
below an alternative model wherein the government is partial to some sectors.
Under the uniform-tariff regime, the tariff is determined by lobbying effort in the economy.
The technology is defined in a way that it is equivalent to the technology under NTR. We write,
(4b)(fiR:t = h(L 1) = h(I)h(0) =0, h'(-)>O,h"()<O
whereI is the amount of labor employed in lobbying by capitalists in sector j and us the total, economy-
svide labor employed in lobbying. Function h(.) is related to function g(.) as follows.
(5a) h(1)!1_,
(Sb)h'(l)11.1<g'(I,)
Theidentity in (5a) may be interpreted as follows. Suppose that under UTR, lobbying is done
by sector i only. Then the level of tariff generated for sector i (and other sectors) by employing! amount
of labor under UTR is h(l..).UnderNTR, sector i can obtain the same tariff by employing i/n amount
of labor. Thus, from an individual sector's viewpoint, the productivity of labor in lobbying under UTR
is 1/n times that under NTR. If under NTR each sector employs 1/n time the total amount of labor used
in lobbying under UTR, the level and structure of protection will be the same under the two regimes.
Put differently, to obtain a sector-specific t, under NTR equal to t under UTR, producers in sector i have
to lobby only 1/n times as hard. Note that we could have formalized the equivalence between the two
4
8regimes differently, by assuming that to obtain an economy-wide t under UTR, n times as much lobbying
in aggregate would be needed as required to obtain a t, under NTR equal to t.1 These two ways of
stating the equivalence are not identical due to diminishing returns to lobbying. None o our qualitative
results relies on our choice of the first form of equivalence. The key point is that under NTR all benefits
of lobbying are internalized, whereas under UTR lobbying in one sector provides spillover benefits to
other import-competing sectors.
According to the inequality in (Sb), for equal amounts of labor employed in lobbying, the
marginal product of lobbying is higher under NTR than under UTR. This assumption is plausible, and
would hold for example under the specific, familiar function g(1- = ( with s < I . But the relationship
in (5a) is not sufficient for its validity. In general, since the identity in (5a) yields h'(l) = (lIn)g'(lIn)
and since we assume g"() < 0, (Sb) does not follow from (Sa).
Figure 1 relates g() and ho functions diagrammatically. We measure 1 and I on the horizontal
axis and g(I,) and h(I) ott the vertical axis. Given the specification in (4a), g(l) has the shape shown by
curve 0g. To derive hO) from this curve, consider a specific value of I, say, 7. The value of go)
corresponding to this value of I, is given by point A on curve 0g. Now suppose that we want to
determine the value of h(I) at I = 1. In view of (5a). this value of h(I) will equal g(lIn) which, in turn,
equals the height of point B. We can conclude that point C which lies horizontally to the right of B and
vertically above 1, = 7 must give h(7). Proceeding in a similar fashion, we can determine all the other
points on curve Oh which represents h(I). The slope of Oh at C equals 1/n times the slope of Og at B.
The inequality in (5) says that the slope of Oh at C is less than the slope of Og at A.
The relationship bewteen h() and g() would then be stated as follows: g(I) = h(l) I
8 Given this form of g(l) and the equality in (5a), h(I),_, = (I/n)'. Differentiating each of these
functions with respect to 1,. we can verify that g '(I) < h '(I). ' Moreover, since < I, we also obtain
g(.), h(.) < 0.
9At this point, differences between the model in Rodrik (1986) and the present model may be
noted. At first, it may seem that if we label sectors as firms in our model, we will obtain Rodrik's
model. This is not true, however, for at least two reasons. First, in Rodrik (1986), tirms within the 4
importablesector share the same technology. In our model, various importable sectors necessarily have
different technologies. Second, in Rodrik (1986), lobbying takes place at the level of the firm. In our
model, lobbying takes place at the level of the industry. Both differences influence our results. The first
difference leads to the result that under UTR, only one sector lobbies in equilibrium. By contrast, in
Rodrik (1986), all firms lobby. The second difference leads to less restrictive second-order conditions
thaninRodrik (1986). As a result, a small increase in the number of Sectors under UTR in our model
may lead to a rise in the amount of resources devoted to lobbying. In Rodrik (1986), an increase in the
number of firms necessarily reduces the amount of resources employed in lobbying. These assertions are
substantiated below.
The lobbying equilibrium is derived by maximizing profits generated by lobbying. Thus, under
NTR, the capitalists' problem is
(6) N7R:niaxg(11)X— wE1
whereg(l)X= t,Xis the revenue generated by lobbying and wi is the cost of lobbying. We assume
that lobbying decisions are coordinated at the industry level, but that production decisions are not.




10where superscript N is used to denote the equilibrium values of endogenous variables under NTR. Our
assumption that capitalists take X as given while choosing l is consistent with full profit maximization
in sector i and can also he derived from a model where lobbying sakes place at the level of the
Making use of (2) after substituting t = g(1), we can rewrite (7) as
1N I N
—
(7 )g (1 )(1 +g(1 ). w; K4)=w
Remembering that the wage rate is already determined in the exportable sector (recall that w= I), this
equation allows us to determine the equilibrium level of 1 and hence ç. The assumption that the
production functions, i(), are distinct across sectors ensures that the r(.) are also distinct. Therefore,
the tax rates implied by (7') will be different across sectors.
We can think of the left hand side of (7') as the marginal benefit from lobbying in sector i (mb)
and the right-hand side as the marginal cost of lobbying. Using this interpretation, (7') simply says that
1 should be chosen so as to equate the marginal benefit of lobbying to the marginal cost.
Differentiating the left-hand side of (7') with respect to !', we obtain
d(mb(14)), N 2 1
(8) = g (14) n() + Ig (1 )l is()
d17
The first term on the right-hand side is negative while the second one is positive. The second-order
conditions of maximization require, however, that the mb(17) be a negative function of /. Thus, the
lobbying equilibrium may be depicted as in Figure 2.
Total profits in sector i are given by (I +g(l)] F(L1, K) - w(L+l) where g(l.,) = t,. Maximization
of this expression with respect to I and L yields (7) and (1 + t)(aF'/aL)w, respectively. We use the
latter condition to obtain the profit function 2r(l +t, w; K) introduced earlier.
11Next, let us consider the lobbying equilibrium under UTR. Given the lobbying function in (4h),
the capitalists in sector i must now solve the problem
(9 UTR: max h(>11)X. — wI.
Venow demonstrate that given the assumption that the production functions F(L1, K) are distinct
across sectors, only one sector will actually lobby under the UTR. Observe that since the first term in
the expression in (9) givet the total benefit from lobbying in sector i, the corresponding marginal benefit
may be written
(10)MB1(1°)h'(1') ,s(1 +h(/3'),w;K1)i =l,...zz
n
where superscript U is used to distinguish the equilibrium under UTR. Also, in view of (4), t =
and h(1u) = tu.
Observe that under UTR, the MB depend solely on total, economy-wide lobbying. As this
variable must be the same for all sectors, the only term which distinguishes the MB(1u) across sectors
is sr(').Given that the F(L,, K) are distinct across sectors, ir(') will also be distinct.For
convenience, let us index goods in such a way that for a given value of 10, 3r1(') > r(') ... > irl).
We depict the MB(10) curves for all n sectors in Figure 3. Given the indexing just introduced,
MB lies above MB2 which, in turn, lies above MB3 (not shown), and so on. This ranking implies that
if there is any lobbying at all, sector I will necessarily lobby. To make the analysis meaningful, assume
thatthefirst-order condition associated with (10) is satisfied as a Strictequality forsector 1. To wit,
(II)hI(1U)n(1 ,h(1u),w; K1) =w
Therefore, sector I capitalists do lobby. Solution to (11) gives usl0 as shown in Figure 2.
What can we say about sectors 2, 3, . . .n? For these sectors, we note that the MB(10) at l =
are below the marginal cost of lobbying, w. Therefore, given that sector l's capitalists choose I? =
1271, thesesectors have no incentive to lobby.In effect, the tariffthey willlobby for (as given by the
intersectionof the MB curves (iI,n-I) with the ww line) is less than what they are able to get from
the lobbying choice made by sector I!
We can now state
Proposition I: Within the model outlined above, only one sector will lobby for tariff
under a uniform tariff regime. By contrast, if tariff uniformity is not imposed, all sectors
will lobby.
We now proceed to compare the levels of lobbying under UTR and NTR. The first point to note
is that if n =I,the equilibria will be identical under the two regimes. This is obvious because with n
=1,the free rider problem which distinguishes the two regimes disappears. In terms of (5a), functions
h() and g() coincide.
If n >I,the amount of resources devoted to lobbying is less under UTR than under NTR not
only on the economy-wide basis but even within the sector which does all the lobbying under UTR.
Although this result is intuitively plausible. it is useful to prove it formally.
In Figure 4,mb'depicts the marginal benefit curve of lobbying in sector 1 under NTR. The
curve represents the left-hand side of (7') for i =1.We denote the equilibrium level of lobbying in
sector I under NTR by T. Now let us evaluate MB under UTR, given by the left-hand side of (11),
at/' =T.Given (4)and(5), we see that g(1) >hOu)and g(T") > h'(1') at i'= T. Makinguse
of these inequalities and the fact that r(.) is a inonotonically increasing function of its first argument,
we see that the left-hand side of (II) must be smaller than the left-hand side of (7').Thatis to say, MB'
< mbat i'= 7. Thus,the marginal-benefit-of-lobbying curve under UTR lies below that under NTR
13as shown by MB' in Figure 4. Remembering that these curves are negatively sloped, we immediately
obtain< T. We have
Pronosition 2, The level of lobbying in the sector which does all the lobbying under UTR is less
than that in the same sector under NTR. By extension, the total amount of resources devoted to
lobbying will be less under UTR than under NTR.
What is the effect of increasing the number of sectors on lobbying? Under NTR, addition of new
sectors has no effect on the pre-existing sectors. New sectors draw resources exclusively from the
exportable sector. But under UTR, the addition of new sectors exacerbates the free rider problem and
does alter the levels of lobbying and tariff. To determine the relationship between lobbying and n, we
use (5a) arid rewrite (11) as
(11')(1/n)[g'(_) ,(i*g(L),
w; = w
The second-order condition ensure that the term in square bracketa is a negative function of lu/fl.
Therefore,an increase in n increases this term. At the same time, I/n declines with n. Therefore, on
balance, the left-hand side of (11') which represents the marginal benefit of may rise or fall with n.
In terms of Figure 4, the MB' curve may shift up or down with an increase in n. Thus, the effect of the
increase in n on the resources devoted to lobbying is ambiguous in general.
Intuitively, ass increase in n affects MB in two ways. First, it reduces the MB' by exacerbating
the free-rider problem. This effect is captured by the term 1/n in (11'). Second, as indicated by the term
in square brackets, the increase in n increases the economy-wide marginal benefit from lobbying. Sector
i also shares in this increase in marginal benefit. Thus, the two effects operate in opposite directions and
14the MB' curve in Figure 4 may shift up or down with an increase in n; the effect on T' is ambiguous
in general.
The possibility that an increase in n can lead to an increase in 1'raisesthe interesting question:
Can the increase in n also lead to an increase in the equilibrium level of tariff. The answer to this
question turns out to be negative. In view of (5a), a rise in t' requires a rise in lu/n.Supposethat lu/fl
does rise. The increase in l'/n implies that the term in the square brackets of (11') must fall. This fact
combined with the information that 1/n also declines with an increase in n implies that the MB' curve in
Figure 4 must shift down. But a downward shift in the MB' curve implies that l'mustfall. Thus, the
initial supposition of a rise in t1/n is contradicted; l'5/n must fall with a rise in n. In the limit, as ii
approaches infinity, 1°/n and hence t° must approach 0. We have
Proposition 3. Under NTR, an increase in the number of sectors has no effect on the extent of
lobbying and the degree of protection accompanying such lobbying in the pre-existing sectors.
By contrast, under UTR. the addition of new sectors reduces the Level of tariff but its effect on
the level oI resources devoted to lobbying is ambiguous. In the Limit, as n becomes large, the
endogenously-determined uniform tariff approaches 0.
Finally, let us compare the welfare levels under UTR and NTR.'° We have shown that the level
of the highest tariff under NTR (good I in our analysis above) Ia higher than the uniform tariff rate under
UTR.Inaddition, more resources are devoted to lobbying under NTR than under UTR. Both of these
factors work in favor of UTRbeingcharacterized byahigher welfare. However, tariffs on goods with
nexttothe highest tariff under NTRmayhe higher or lower than the uniform tariff under UTR.For
°The notion of social welfare is somewhat ambiguous in the present context since the government
is implicitly denied the power to redistribute income. This problem can be overcome, however, as in
Rodrik (1986).
15example, if the MB2, MB3,., NIB' curves lie far apart from the MBt curve, tariffs on goods 2,3,...n
underNTR will lie below the uniform tariff under UTR. However, for a sufficiently large number of
sectors in the economy, the uniform tariff will he below all tariff rates under NTR. Thus, if n is large
or potential lobbying under NTR is widespread, a UTR regime will yield a higher level of welfare. We
summarize these results in
Prooosition 4. In general, the welfare ranking of UTR and NTR is ambiguous. If the number
of importable sectors is large or potential benefits from lobbying are evenly spread across sectors,
UTR will generate a higher level of welfare.
Before presenting the next model, we note that the present model can be modified to allow for
a wage rate that is variable in terms of the price of the exportable, although such a modification
complicates the analysis substantially Thus, if we assume that the exportable also uses a specific factor.
the wage rate will no longer be determined entirely in that sector. Instead, the wage rate will depend on
labor demands from all sectors and lobbyists. The implication is that equations of the type shown in (7')
cannot be solved for 17 independently of other equations of the model. Put differently, the wage rate
in these equations is not a given Constant but a function of different labor demands. This means that the
tariff rates in different sectors become interdependent through the wage rate; higher protection for one
import-competing sector implies a lower protection for the other sectors. -
2. Model II: The lnut-Price Effect
In the previous section. we have shown that the presence of a free-rider problem may be a strong
motivating factor behind the adoption of a uniform-tariff rule. In this section, we suggest another factor
16which maymakethe uniform tariff a desirable policy. In particular, we focus on imported intermediate
inputs.
In order to draw a sharp distinction between the present model and the previous one, we
deliberately assume away the presence of a free-rider problem. This is done by assuming that there is
only one final importable and that the imported input is not produced at home. In this setting, there is
only one sector which can benefit from lobbying for a tariff.
To introduce the model formally, assume that there are two final goods, 0 and 1. As before,
good 0 is an exportable and uses labor only. Good 1 is an importable which uses a sector-specific
capital, labor and a pure imported input. The imported input is denoted 2. We note at the outset that
the assumption that the imported input is used in importable and not in the exportable plays an important
role in our analysis. Implications of the model when the input is also used in the exportable are discussed
later.
As in the previous section, taking the tariff rate as given, we can summarize the solution to the
firms' profit maximization problem in sector 1 in the restricted profit function II'(l +t1, 1 +t, w; K).
The partial derivatives of this function with respect to the first three arguments, respectively, yield the
output, negative of imported-input demand, and negative of labor demand in sector 1.
The lobbying function in sector I is assumed to take the same form as in (4a). As there are no
other import-competing sectors. (4h), (5a) and (5h) play no role in the present model. Under NTR. there
being no lobby for sector 2. we have t2 = 0. In sector 1, the lobbying equilibrium is given by
(12)g'(1")ll (1 +g(1'),1,w;K1) =w
Solution to this equation yields / which, is conjunction with the lobbying function, enables us to
determine the equilibrium tariff rate.
Next, consider the UTR. Here the tariff granted to good I is imposed automatically on the
imported input as well. Therefore, the lobbying equilibrium is given by
17(13) (l)U(.1*g(l°). 1.g(l10), w; K1) = w
Comparing(12) and (13), we see that for 1= i, the left-handside of the latter a smaller. Thatis to
say, the marginal-benefit-of-lobbying curve under UTR will lie below that under NTR. It is then
immediately obvious that in equilibrium, t < 1 or equivalently tu < t. Intuitively, under UTR, tariff
protection is accompanied by a production tax on good I in the form of a tariff on the imported input.
Therefore, the marginal benefit of lobbying is reduced and the lobbyists seek less protection than under
NTR.
Thelower tariff under IJTR will be necessarily beneficial in terms of a smaller distortion in
consumption. In addition, the presence of a tariff on the imported input implies a lower effective
protection to the final importable and hence a smaller distortion in production. Finally, resources devoted
to lobbying are also less under UTR. Thus, welfare is unambiguously higher under UTR. We have
Proposition 5. Assuming that the imported input is used exclusively in the final importable, the
tariff on the final importable is lower and welfare higher under UTR than under NTR.
We can now deal with two important complications. First, suppose that the imported input is also
produced domestically. Then if both import-competing sectors can lobby for tariffs, the free-rider
problem considered in the previous section will reappear. This factor by itself is favorable to UTR.
However, we must now also take into account the distortionary effect of the tariff on the intermediate
input. A priori, we cannot determine whether this distortion is lower or higher under UTR than under
NTR. However, if the number of import-competing sectors is large, the free-rider problem will play a
decisive role and UTR will be welfare superior.
18The second complication has more serious implications.This complication ariseswhen the
imported input is used in the exportable. To make the point succinctly, assume that the input is not
produced at home and that it is not used in the final importable. In this case, the zero-profit condition
in good 0 dictates that the wage be a declining function oft,. Thus, the restricted profit function in sector
I will have the form H(1÷:, w(1+r2); K1)wherew'(.) < 0. Under NTR, the tariff will besought by
and granted to only sector 1, i.e., t2 = 0. In Figure 1, let rub' continue to represent the marginal-benefit-
of-lobbying curve under this regime. If we now switch to the UTR, holding ( at 7, w will decline and
the marginal benefit from lobbying will thjftu. That is to say, the MB' curve will now lie the
mb' curve. Moreover, the ww line will be below that shown in Figure 4. Thus, more resources will
be devoted to lobbying under UTR than under NTR. More importantly, the level of tariff will be higher
and the level of welfare lower under UTR. Intuitively, lobbying now has two benefits: not only does
it increase protection, but it also reduces labor costs thanks to general equilibrium interactions.
These results suggest that when imported inputs are used primarily in exportables, a welfare
maximizing government will not adopt the UTR. Here the option to combine the UTR with duty
drawbacks on inputs used in exports becomes an attractive option. For it can be shown that when the
UTR is combined with a duty drawback scheme, welfare is higher than under NTR.iI A practical
difficulty with this approach, however, is that the presence of the drawback itself undermines the
government's credibility with respect to the UTR. Strictly speaking, the very presence of the drawback
violates the uniform tariff rule and may open the government to attacks by lobbies for further exceptions
to the rule.
From a practical standpoint, two qualifications to this complication may be noted. First, in most
developing countries, imported inputs are used more intensively in import-competing goods than in
"For a recent analysis of input tariffs and duty drawbacks in a conventional trade model, see
Panagariya (1991).
19exportable sectors. Therefore,onbalance these inputs may still favor the UTR over NTR. Second, the
free-rider problem emphasized in the last section may be sufficiently important that desptte the problem
noted in the previous two paragraphs the level ot tariffs under UTR may he sufficient to make it the
preferred regime.
Model Ill: Precommitment Effect
In the last two sections, we have considered situations when protection is determined on the
demand side. In this section, we consider briefly a model where protection is determined on the supply
side. We hypothesize that the government in the first period has a conventional welfare function but
knows that the future government will favor one or more specific sectors over the others. In this setting,
the adoption of the UTR by the present government may serve as an instrument for tying the hands of
a future government. Alternatively, a rational citizenry behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance may wish
to adopt the UTR. That is to say, if individuals do not know which sector will employ them after the
veil is lifted, they may find the UTR the preferred regime.
Our point can be made most simply using a model with one exportable and two importables.
Both importables are final goods. As before, the exportable is denoted 0 and importables I and 2. The
exportable uses only labor while importables use labor and a sector-specific factor. Assuming that the
future government has a preference for sector 1, its problem may be written
Max.eis1(t+t1,w;IC1)152(1+52,w;K2) ..wL
(14)t.t —
— t1is(1*t1. w;K1) —t2it(1+t2, w;K2)
wherea > I. If we set a = I, the expression in (14) represents the national income at world prices.
The assumption a > I implies that the government favors sector I over the other sector in its social
20weltare function. The nation's true welfare as perceived by the present government or thecitizenry
behind the Rawisian veil of Ignorance is determined by a more conventional welfare function, however.
As in the previous two sections, the wage rate is determined entirely in Sector 0. 'Therefore,w
is fixed. The first order conditions under NTR are




where superscript N distinguishes tariffs under NTR, Equation (15a) implies t' > owhile(15b) yields
=0.This result is quite intuitive: since the government weights the output of good 1 moreheavily
than the world price, a tariff on ii is warranted. By contrast, Good 2 is weighted by the worldprice so
that no tariff on it is warranted.
Next, suppose that the government's hands are tied by the uniform tariff rule. In this case, we




Comparing (15a) and (16), it can be shown that t( > I. In general, we cannot say that under a
conventional welfare function the country is necessarily better off under UTR than under NTR.
However, the possibility that this may be so esists. It can be shown that the smaller the share of the
preferred sector(s) in the economy the more likely that it is that the UTR will be superior.
The model in the present section should he distinguished from that in section I. Unlike Model
I, the present model has no lobbying costs. Therefore, the free-rider problem which was central in the
former is absent from the latter, Instead, the result in the present case is driven by the fact that under
21the UTR the government is forced to pay a penalty for protection to sector I in terms of protection to
sector 2 which it would like to avoid.
Basic conclusions of this section may be summarized in
Proposition 6. Assuming that the government has a preference for particular sector, the tariff
rate under UTR will be lower than that granted to the preferred sector under NTR. The level
of welfare may be higher or lower under UTR, however. Ceteris paribus, the smaller the share
of the preferred sector(s) in GDP measured at world prices, the more likely that welfare will be
higher under UTR.
4. Conclusions
In spite of increasing popularity of uniform tariffs, to date the rationale for their superiority over
alternative structures of tariffs has not been established. In this paper, we have focused on models where
tariffs are determined endogenously. \Ve have shown that in each of our models, it is possible for a
uniform tariff regime to yields higher welfare than a regime wherein tariffs are allowed to diverge across
sectors.
We have identified three effects that may exert a moderating influence on political pressure for
protection under tariff uniformity. The first of these is the free-rider effect: a uniform tariff regime is
likely to generate less lobbying activity than a regime under which aectoral tariffs can differ. If the
politically active import-competing sectors are numerous, this will enhance economic efficiency. The
second is the input-price effect. When imported intermediate inputs are used predominantly in import-
competing sectors (as in developing countries), tariff uniformity will reduce the enthusiasm of import-
competing interests for tariffs. On the other hand, if imported inputs are used primarily in exportables,
tariffs will be sought even more actively. Finally, we have the precommitment effect. Tariff uniformity
22increases thecost to a future governmentofprotectingfavored sectors. If these favored sectors are small
(relativeto national income at worldprices), astrategyof increasingcosts in this manner islikely to
enhance efficiency.
We think that our approach in this paper serves two important purposes. First, it highlights the
need to be explicit about the logic that underlies the advocacy of tariff uniformity in specific cases.
Vague references to political-economy reasons are insufficient to justify a preference for tariff
uniformity. As we have shown, none of the arguments we have focussed on presents an unambiguous,
airtight case for tariff uniformity. Second, our approach makes precise the set of circumstances under
which political-economy arguments can indeed be relied on. Thus, if the arguments in this paper form
the basis for the adoption of uniformity, it is essential to verify that the kind of lobbying pressures or
governmental preferences for specific sectors which are central to our conclusions do exist. Moreover,
it is important to verify that the conditions we have identified under which uniformity is desirable are
likely tohold.
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